'Suffering' is a central discursive trope for the right-to-die movement. In this article, we ask how proponents of 5 physician-assisted dying (PAD) articulate suffering with the role of medicine at the end of life within the context 6 of a decriminalization and legalization debate. We draw upon empirical data from our study of Carter v. 7
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A C C E P T E D ACCEPTED MANUSCRIPT life. As Lavi (2001) argues, the right-to-die movement must be properly seen "in the medical context in which it 48 arises and primarily as a solution to the problem of pain in dying" (p. 138). Implicit, too, in Arvay's statement is 49 an indictment on medicine's failure to adequately address suffering. This article therefore aims to investigate 50 how proponents articulate suffering with the role of medicine, particularly in the end-of-life context. We use 51 'articulate' to mean the process of forming discursive linkages between two different entities or concepts. In 52 other words, how do the proponents construct the relationship between suffering and medical interventions at In order to answer these questions, we draw upon a set of original, empirical data from our 58 investigation of Carter v. Canada. We begin by describing Carter in greater detail. We then describe two social 59 phenomena that others have identified as transformative of the contemporary dying experience: the increasing 60 use of life-extending interventions in mainstream curative medicine and the emergence and rise of palliative 61 care as the paradigmatic end-of-life care modality. This description serves two purposes: to provide readers 62 with necessary context for many claims advanced by Carter's proponents and to serve as a basis for discussion 63 of our empirical data in the last section of the article. We then proceed to describe our study methods. In our 64 reporting of results, we find that proponents see curative medicine as complicit in the production of suffering 65 at the end of life. Proponents draw limits around the ability of palliative care to relieve suffering; they further 66 contend that in some instances, palliative care can actually produce additional suffering. At the same time, 67
proponents insist that physicians must be involved in any legal regime of assisted dying. Thus, we also find that 68 proponents emphasize how a request for PAD can set in motion an interactive medical process that has the 69 potential to alleviate suffering at the end of life. In the discussion section, we argue that proponents' 70 articulation of suffering with the role of medicine constitutes a discourse through which different 71 configurations of end-of-life care come to be rejected or accepted within the larger framework of the 72 medicalization of dying. 73
II. BACKGROUND 74 75
Contextualizing Carter v. Canada 76 77
Political efforts to legalize PAD date back to the late nineteenth century (Dowbiggin, 2002; Lavi, 2007) . Carter's mother to die at an assisted suicide clinic in Switzerland the previous year, an event that they made 91 public immediately afterward. Taylor was a woman with Amyotrophic Lateral Sclerosis (ALS) and Shoichet was 92 a family physician. The diversity of the claimants was meant to reflect the diversity of persons with stakes in 93 the legalization of PAD. 94
The Carter claimants challenged the Canadian Criminal Code prohibitions on assisting in another 95 person's suicide and on consenting to one's death. The claimants' legal arguments essentially advanced along 96 the lines of autonomy and equality. The autonomy argument stated that ill patients ought to have the right to 97
seek PAD in order to control the manner and time of their own dying. The equality argument stated that since 98 attempting suicide was not a crime, the ban on assisting suicide had the discriminatory effect of preventing 99 disabled persons incapable of suicide from taking their own lives. The SCC eventually agreed with the 100 claimants' autonomy argument and having done so, found it unnecessary to adjudicate the matter in terms of 101 equality (for more details on the ruling, see Karsoho, 2015) . 102
The right-to-die movement, like other social movements, developed within a socio-historical context 103 that both enabled and constrained what could be accomplished by the proponents. In the rest of the section, 104 we discuss in brief two important social phenomena that have radically transformed the dying experience in 105 contemporary times: the growing use of life-prolonging technologies in mainstream medicine and the M A N U S C R I P T A C C E P T E D ACCEPTED MANUSCRIPT 5 emergence of palliative care. Many authors see these phenomena as constituting the larger process of the 107 medicalization of dying and intersecting with the right-to-die movement in significant ways. 108
Mainstream Curative Medicine and The Extension of Life 109
Mainstream curative medicine is now ever more reliant on the sciences and technologies (Clarke et al., 110 2003) . For persons nearing the end of life, such "technoscientization of biomedical practices" (Clarke et al., 111 2010) manifests itself in the normalization and routinization of life-extending technologies (Kaufman et al., 112 2004; Shim et al., 2006) . These life-prolonging technologies have created new forms of dying (e.g., 113
neurovegatative state) and at the same time remade the moral frameworks at the end of life (Kaufman, 2005; 114 Kaufman & Morgan, 2005) . 115
In Kaufman's (2015) incisive ethnography on "ordinary medicine," she notes how the biomedical 116 research industry is producing evidence of effective therapies at historically unprecedented rate. Many of 117 these therapies (e.g., implantable cardiac defibrillator) were originally intended as last resort options. Once 118 insurable, however, they become standard care and "ethically necessary and therefore difficult, if not 119 impossible, for physicians, patients, and families to refuse" (Kaufman, 2015, 7) . Indeed, refusing these 120 potentially life-prolonging therapies seems irrational or even downright morally wrong in a cultural context in 121 which death is seen as bad. The problem then is that "few know when that line between life-giving therapies 122 and too much treatment is about to be crossed...the widespread lament about where that line is located and 123 what to do about it grows ever louder" (Kaufman, 2015:, 2) . The use of life-extending technologies reproduces 124 and, at the same time, is made possible by the organising principle of mainstream medicine: the (mistaken) 125 belief that life can be prolonged more or less indefinitely through medical interventions, a pervasive cultural 126 ideology that Dumas and Turner (2007; call "prolongevism" and which they view as producing more 127 harms than benefits to persons at the end of life. (Clark, 2002; Clark, 2007) . These concerns about care of the dying were taken up most notably by Cicely 132 Saunders, who is widely acknowledged to be the founder of the modern hospice movement. Saunders founded 133 the first modern hospice, St. Christopher's Hospice, in London, UK, in 1967 (Saunders, 2000) . The success of St. 134
Christopher's, together with Saunders' prolific writing contributed to the development of "a new approach to 135 the care of dying people which would harness together medical innovation in pain and symptom management 136 with wider concerns for the practical and social needs of patients and families, as well as responsiveness to 137 spiritual matters" (Clark & Seymour, 1999, 72) . One of Saunders' most important intellectual contributions to 138 medical knowledge and practice is the concept of 'total pain,' which argues that suffering is irreducible to 139 physical pain and must be understood in its multiple dimensions: physical, psychological, social, and spiritual. In 140 order to relieve suffering, care for the dying must therefore be similarly holistic (Clark, 1999) . 141
The modern hospice movement quickly gained international following. Balfour Mount, a Montreal 142 urologist, coined and brought the term 'palliative care' into wide usage, preferring its use to 'hospice' because 143 in French the word 'hospice' referred to almshouse (a house for the poor, not the dying) (Lewis, 2007) . 144
Knowledge and practice of palliative care quickly spread to other countries such that 115 of the world's 234 145 countries now have one or more palliative care services (Clark, 2007) . Palliative care, however, has not 146 provided equal benefits to all patients. The development of palliative care is deeply rooted in oncology, "which 147 has shaped the conceptual model of palliative care, produced some of its major leaders and innovators, and 148 provided a population of patients with the obvious potential to benefit from a new approach to the 149 management of those with advanced disease" (Clark, 2007:, 430) . This means that cancer patients are more 150 likely than patients with other terminal illnesses to benefit from palliative care (Clark, 2007) . whereby physicians who self-identify as part of the palliative care community voice a strong and consistent 157 message of opposition to PAD. Reasons given for opposing PAD include, but are not limited to, the ethical 158 principle of respect for life, the ability of palliative care interventions to address suffering, and concern about 159 the diversion of resources away from palliative care. 160
The Medicalization of Dying 161 162 The two phenomena just described attest to the ways in which dying in Western societies has changed 163 radically since the Middle Ages. There are, of course, other processes (e.g., demographic transition) that 164 underlie the changes and these have been explored elsewhere (see Ariès, 1981; Kellehear, 2007; Seale, 1998; 165 Walter, 1994) . Starting in the mid-twentieth century, however, changes in dying are best characterised as 166 medicalization (Howarth, 2007) . As Broom (2015, 6) The term 'end-of-life care' (EOLC) is best understood as a configuration of healthcare resources (i.e., 186 people, practices, and technologies) mobilized at the last phase of a person's life. While palliative care has 187 become the paradigmatic EOLC modality today (Livne, 2014) , it does not have a complete monopoly over EOLC. 188
According to Connelly (1998) , there exist two dominant logics in EOLC: on the one hand, there is the 'dying 189 well' path in medicine, as represented, practiced, and promoted by palliative care professionals. On the other 190 hand, there is still the traditional 'life-saving' path of medicine whereby treatment is directed at curing the 191 patient's disease; the goal is always to prolong life and comfort care is secondary to this goal. For most dying 192 individuals, then, the medicalization of dying has come to mean that their last days of life are strongly shaped 193 by either or the interplay of these two EOLC logics. For proponents of PAD, the medicalization of dying serves 194 as the platform from which to argue the moral imperative of new options in EOLC. In the results section, we will 195
show how participants in Carter v. Canada engaged both EOLC logics (the 'dying well' path and the 'life-saving' 196 path) as inadequate in addressing, and in some cases even perpetuating, the fundamental problem of suffering 197 in dying. 198
III. MATERIALS AND METHODS 199 200
Carter v. Canada represents for us a "critical case" (Flyvbjerg, 2001 ) through which we can fruitfully 201 investigate how PAD proponents articulate suffering with the role of medicine at the end of life. A critical case 202 is not the same as a representative or a typical case; instead it is a case that is rich in information. Indeed, so 203 extensive was the scope of evidence and actors involved in Carter that an Irish court in a subsequent PAD 204 litigation noted that the review conducted by the Canadian trial judge was "enormously detailed and countries. The selection of a critical case is important if the goal of analysis is to generalize not to other cases 209 (i.e., statistical generalisation) but to theory (Ruddin, 2006) , as is our intent here. 210
Prior to data collection, the study received Institutional Review Board approval from McGill University. 211
The data we analyse consist of all of the legal artefacts generated by the case (i.e., affidavits, trial transcripts, 212 factums, court decisions), all amounting to over 4,000 pages of texts, and in-depth interviews with key 213 participants in the case. The first and third authors also attended the SCC hearing on October 15, 2014 and 214 took observational notes. Our selection of interviews with participants is predicated upon the insight that not 215 all actors are created equal in a controversy (Venturini, 2010) ; we therefore selected only those actors with the 216 most impact in the case: the claimants, interveners, and witnesses whose opinions were cited by the judges in 217 the case. In the case of the witnesses, for each participant who did not respond, declined, or was lost to follow 218 up, we made sure to recruit another participant who could speak to similar issues. Our recruitment process 219 resulted in 42 interviews. The interviews were designed to 'speak' directly to the legal data; the interview guide 220 for each participant was tailored according to that participant's legal documents. Our participants were 221 interviewed either in person or over Skype. All interviews were audio recorded and transcribed. Informed 222 consent, either written or verbal, was obtained from every participant. For those participants who chose to 223 remain anonymous, we identify only the data source (e.g., interview, trial transcript). Those we name in this 224 article have given us permission at the time of interview to identify them. Data collection for this article 225 spanned 21 months from June 2013 to March 2015. 226
Analysis proceeded along an iterative process involving coding, memo writing, and literature review. 227
We began by uploading all of the documents to Atlas.ti TM . Karsoho then coded all of the documents both 228 deductively, using themes derived from the literature, and inductively for emergent themes. For this article, 229 our analysis was initially guided by an analytical interest in the role of medicine in the debate over legalization 230 of PAD. Karsoho reviewed all of the codes pertaining to this issue; during this process, 'medicalization' and 231 'suffering' emerged as "core categories" (Strauss & Corbin, 1998) . analysis was then presented to the co-authors for multiple rounds of further analysis and clarification. 234
Our analytical approach to the data is guided by insights from studies of discourse in sociology of 235 knowledge. Following Potter (1996) , we understand discourse to be talk and text in action. Discourse here is 236 understood to be part of a broader repertoire of human actions used to accomplish something. In order to 237 understand how talk and text do things, we have to consider their "deployment in specific interactions and the 238 nature of those interactions (Potter, 1996, 180) ." This understanding of discourse guides our analysis in two 239 interrelated ways. First, we interrogate the practical nature of actors' text and talk, rather than its truth value. 240
That is, we are constantly asking, 'what are our study participants attempting to do here?' What legal, moral, 241 or political aims are advanced by describing suffering in particular ways? Second, we treat actors' discourse not 242 as a resource but as a topic (Gilbert and Mulkay, 1984) . In other words, we do not take the words of our 243 participants to be 'true' but attend to the ways in which meaning is produced and to what effects. Therefore, 244 proceeding from the assumption that language is "used to do things; it is a medium of action" (Potter, 1996, 245 11) allows us to be mindful of the broader legal context in which our data is produced. We approach the data 246 not as evidence of a 'true' or 'real' perspective on suffering and the role of medicine but rather as a strategic 247 deployment of language by the participants to advance specific agenda. 248
In this article, we focus and present data on the proponents' discourse; however, their discourse was 249 necessarily constructed vis-à-vis the opponents'. Thus, in a few places, we present data from the opponents' 250 discourse to provide greater clarity for readers. Our use of the term 'proponents' or 'opponents' is not 251 intended to elide the diversity of opinions and positions within each 'side' in the debate. We recognize that our 252 study participants may differ in the strength of their support for the claimants or the government. By 253 proponents, we mean the claimants and all of the actors (interveners, witnesses) who are strategically enrolled 254 by the claimants to advance their case for decriminalization. Opponents refer to all of the actors on the 255 opposing side. 256
Proponents' discursive articulation of suffering occurs throughout the data. Expressions of suffering are 259 most common amongst -although not limited to -the claimants, lay affiants, and those expert witnesses who 260 professionally identify as physicians. Lay affiants often speak about either their own illness or having witnessed 261 their loved ones die, using such adjectives as "horrific," "heartbreaking," and "torturous" to describe their 262 experiences. Physicians, on the other hand, often speak of their professional experience caring for patients 263 with intractable suffering. 264
There is an overwhelming consensus among the proponents that only suffering arising from medically 265 diagnosable conditions could ever justify the need for PAD, the sole exception being a representative from 266
Right to Die Canada who told us during interview that she would also accept suffering from a non-medical 267 condition as a justification (e.g., tiredness of life). Further, mental illness is discussed less as a source of primary 268 suffering at the end of life, and more as a potential source of interference with a person's ability to make a 269 clear and rational decision around assisted dying. During the SCC hearing, for example, Arvay suggests that any 270 existing mental co-morbidities (e.g., depression in a context of cancer) be treated before a patient be granted 271 access to PAD. Finally, while intractable (physical) suffering could occur at any point in the illness trajectory, 272
proponents emphasize suffering that occurs in the last phase of life. 273
Having described how suffering appears in our data, we now turn to the ways in which suffering is 274 linked by proponents to the practices of mainstream curative medicine, palliative care, and assisted dying. 275
The Complicity of Mainstream Curative Medicine 276 277
Proponents evince an awareness of the larger biomedical context in which the contemporary dying 278 experience is embedded: that medicine plays an increasingly important role at the end of life. Citing figures 279 from Belgium, one EOLC researcher notes that medical end-of-life decisions are now implicated in half of all 280 deaths in the country. According to this researcher, this means that "doctors are more and more responsible 281 for decisions that have huge implications on the quality of life of the patients" (interview, Deliens). 282
While proponents acknowledge that "medicalization" prolongs life, it does not come without 283 concomitant costs. In fact, proponents argue that it is the medical efforts to prolong life that render the dying In order for people to maintain life in terminal illnesses, they very often have to be on wretched volumes of 287 drugs that make them sick, that make them queasy, that make them extraordinarily sad, that sink them 288 into a depression regardless. So then you're on this whole super highway of trying to balance the 289 depressants; the drugs that they have to have to keep them alive is giving them, needs to be counteracted 290 with drugs to try and lift their spirits like with [antidepressant]. 291 (Interview.) 292 293
For Laforest, the interventions necessary to prolong life may be causing harms that then need to be 294 counteracted with more medications. She pointedly views the cascade of interventions and suffering as 295 "ridiculous." Medicine, in the words of the proponents, has made life worse for terminally ill patients. 296
To be sure, proponents understand that the severity of suffering is, to a large extent, determined by 297 the nature of the illness itself. In many of the affidavits, seemingly exhaustive lists of symptoms of various 298 illnesses are presented, enumerated by the proponents to showcase the enormity of suffering that terminally 299 ill patients experience. In describing these illnesses, they also express overwhelming moral disapprobation 300 towards the culture of curative medicine. In particular, they highlight the inherent life-prolonging imperative of 301 mainstream curative medicine and the paternalistic and death-denial attitude of its practitioners. One retired 302 urologist laments that nowadays "[d]ying naturally is very difficult; there's almost always a medical 303 intervention at the end of life, because of the patronizing attitudes of the medical profession, they just want to 304 keep on treating. The medical profession has been slow to understand the limits of medicine" (interview, 305 Syme). Another physician says that in his opinion, "physicians, as a group, do not sufficiently recognize that 306 death is the inevitable end for all of us. I sometimes think physicians tend to ignore this fact to an even greater 307 extent than members of the general public" (affidavit, Welch). Conversely, proponents argue that those 308 physicians who support PAD are very much cognizant of their own limitations and humble in the face of death: 309 "But physician-assisted dying? Here we're talking about people who have a terminal illness who are dying, and 310 the physician is being humane and is accepting the reality that we can't fix you" (emphases added, interviewee where life prolongation is a moral imperative and physicians are paternalistic and death-denying, thus further 317 contributing to suffering. Curative medicine, then, is perceived by proponents to be complicit in the production 318 of end-of-life suffering. We suggest that blaming, in this context, is both a moral and political act on the part of 319 the proponents: it identifies a cause while at the same time obligates a particular group of actors (i.e., 320 physicians) to redress the wrong. 321
The Limits of Palliative Care 322 323
In Carter, the proponents actively draw limits on what palliative care could accomplish in terms of 324 relieving suffering. In particular, they argue that not all pain and symptoms could be alleviated with palliative 325 care. We note first that the majority of proponents are unequivocal in their support for increasing the access 326 and availability of palliative care. They diverge from opponents, however, in the latter's position that palliative 327 care can address "the majority, if not all symptoms that may lead a person to consider ending their life" 328 (factum, the Catholic Health Alliance of Canada). 329 Susan Bracken's affidavit describes her husband's experience dying from metastatic lung cancer in a 330 palliative care ward. In our interview with her, she explains that the clinicians treating her husband "have 331 almost all of the means for alleviating suffering. But there are some that they cannot, I know this is true for a 332 fact because my husband's pain was terrible, and they were giving him morphine by pump and everything that 333 he wanted, but he still was in terrible pain and moaning, and they could not stop the pain" (interview). Many 334 of the physician-witnesses corroborate such experience in claiming in their affidavits or during interviews to 335 have seen first-hand in the clinic the failure of palliative care in alleviating patients' pain and symptoms. 336
Opponents argue that in cases where patient's pain and symptoms are intractable, there is always the 337 option of sedation. While sedation can be intermittent and of short duration, the type that is subject to M A N U S C R I P T
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14 contestation in Carter is what our participants call palliative or terminal sedation, which is the elimination of 339 patient's consciousness until death, coupled with the removal of nutrition and hydration (which both parties 340 recognise as a separate clinical decision). During the trial, Arvay references studies suggesting that sedated 341 patients might still be suffering. In one cross-examination of a palliative care physician, he pushes for the 342 witness to acknowledge this: 343 Q: It's fair to say though, given this article and the one I've just read to you, you can't assure patients, 344 you can't promise patients that with palliative sedation they will not suffer? This excerpt comes at the end of a long exchange in which Arvay tries to press the point that in some cases, 349 palliative sedation may merely be masking suffering. That is to say, while the intervention might be efficacious 350 in reducing or eliminating observable signs of patient's consciousness, patients might in fact still be suffering 351 intolerably until death. 352
Our participants argue that despite palliative care's efforts at holistic intervention (recall Saunders' 353 notion of total pain), there are non-physical forms of suffering that lie outside of its ambit. Different 354 participants use different terms to describe this suffering but the term 'existential' is commonly referenced. For 355
Dying with Dignity, a right-to-die advocacy organisation, existential suffering results "from profoundly 356 diminished quality of life and a subjective experience of loss of dignity" (affidavit). Moreover, participants 357 assert that such existential suffering is felt most acutely by patients with non-cancer diseases. We think it 358 significant that out of the 18 lay affidavits describing witnesses' or their loved ones' illness experience 359 submitted by the claimants, only two concern cancer. The rest describes experiences with various 360 neurodegenerative diseases, such as Motor Neurone disease or ALS. Elayne Shapray, a woman with Multiple 361
Sclerosis (MS), writes: 362
The suffering I and others with progressive, degenerative illnesses such as MS endure, is both 363 psychological and social, involving a loss of autonomy, independence, privacy and ability to do the 364 things that give joy to one's life. These losses cannot be meaningfully addressed by any form of 365 palliative care. 366
(Affidavit, Shapray.) 367 368
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In arguing that there are certain losses that cannot be addressed by palliative care, Shapray thus construes 369 palliative care as irrelevant and unhelpful to her situation. Proponents use existential suffering as a discursive 370 sign to denote a space of lived experience that lies outside of the reach of palliative care. 371
To be sure, there are those on the opposing side who acknowledge that palliative care "is not a 372 panacea when it comes to eliminating all suffering. And it would be hubris to think that anything could 373 eliminate suffering in every instance" (interview, Chochinov). But for the opponents, the limits of palliative care 374 constitute a moral Rubicon that should never be crossed. As one of the interveners on the opposing side says, The following exchange between Arvay and a palliative care physician testifying for the government is 386 illustrative of the proponents' strategy. Under a framework of inquiry about typical palliative care interventions 387 for an ALS patient, Arvay begins by asking the witness to confirm that "the physician will be able to explain to 388 the ALS patient that at some point they will suffer pain for which they will require medication for relief, right?" 389
The witness confirms that the majority of ALS patients will experience musculoskeletal pain and that although 390 the first line of treatment would be acetaminophen, not opioids, if pain persists and not amenable to non-391 opioid drugs, then "ALS patients will come into an opioid or a narcotic-type medication at some point." Arvay 392 then asks a leading question: "And the family physician would be qualified to explain generally the side effects 393 and 10 contraindications of some of these --some of the medications?" After the witness responds M A N U S C R I P T
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16 affirmatively, Arvay points out that one of the common side effects of narcotics is constipation and 395 counteracting constipation requires laxatives, which could cause diarrhoea. The witness affirms that the use of 396 laxatives is sometimes required. Arvay then moves to another symptom of ALS, incontinence, and employs a 397 similar line of questioning: incontinence is addressed by the use of catheters, which could cause bladder 398 infections. Arvay ends by asking if the physician "will be able to tell this patient…as he or she comes to the last 399 few months of life they are going to be dependent on others for all of their care?" The witness, again, concedes 400 that there will come a time during the illness trajectory when patients will become paralyzed (trial transcript, 401 Downing). Liberties Association, one of the claimants, tells us, "an individual who had always taken great pride in being 410 independent and adventurous and self-contained might find it deeply painful to have his wife feed him with a 411
spoon…that's what this lawsuit is about" (interview). 412
Palliative sedation is further seen by proponents as potentially causing suffering for those standing 413 vigil. Gloria Taylor writes in her affidavit of what she believes could happen were she to be sedated until death: 414 "I believe terminal sedation would horrify and traumatize my 11 year-old granddaughter…her mind would be 415 filled with visions of my body wasting away while I was 'alive'…I believe that would be cruel to my 416 granddaughter" (affidavit). One physician says that it's "absurd" that "we don't allow ourselves as physicians to 417
give you enough to let you die, but we can put you in a coma and keep you alive that way, that's a completely 418 M A N U S C R I P T
undignified way to end your life, and it just prolongs suffering for the family, to see you in a coma for days to 419 weeks" (interviewee 26). 420
This derogation of palliative care is central to the claimants' argument that whether "the [patient's] 421 condition is without remedy is to be assessed by reference to treatment options acceptable to the patient" 422 (italics added, factum), and not by reference to whether or not treatment options exist per se. Demonstrating 423 that the interventions of palliative care are unacceptable to some patients disabuses the notion that 424 proponents are motivated by a blinkered desire for PAD. One of the government's witnesses, for example, 425 believes that "the vast majority of [patients who want PAD] don't know and can't appreciate the full 426 significance of the options they would have if they truly had…really good palliative care" (interviewee 1). 427
Claiming that "really good palliative care" could have pernicious effects turns proponents' insistence for PAD 428 into a seemingly rational, legitimate and necessary EOLC option. 429
The Significance of Physician-Assisted Dying 430 431
While there is disagreement among the proponents as to the scope of physicians' involvement in 432 assisted dying, all agree on the necessity for the practice to be placed within a medical framework. The retired 433 urologist we quoted earlier says that he is "opposed to approaches… to simply make information and 434 medication available to people outside of a medical framework… This should not be something which the 435 responsibility should be passed off, which some people have suggested to thanatologists or lay people who 436 would carry out this work" (interview, Syme). During the trial, this emphasis on the role of medicine by 437 proponents is brought into sharp relief by the Crown Counsel. Recall that the proponents' equality argument 438 states that persons with disability are disadvantaged with regards to access to suicide. At the SCC hearing, the 439 Crown Counsel remarks that it is "not that some people have a range of options and other people have 440 none…there are options for ending life open to everyone, even the most severely disabled." She then presents 441 refusal of nutrition and hydration as one example of those options. The Counsel argues that what the 442 proponents actually want "is not access to assistance for the usual means of suicide, what they want is…access 443 to a medicalized suicide" (emphases added, trial transcript).
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We see the opposing side as narrowly interpreting the proponents' insistence for the medicalization of 445 assisted dying in terms of the legal provision of lethal medication. In other words, opponents often reduce the 446 significance of PAD to its final act only, the hastening of death. For example, Euthanasia Prevention Coalition, 447 one of the interveners supporting the government's position, sees the question of euthanasia as one of "how 448 are we going to get you out of this world as quick as possible" (interview). This reduction of PAD to its final act 449 is concordant with another opponent's view of the practice as emblematic of "living in a quick-fix society" 450 (interviewee 30). 451
Proponents do not disavow that placing PAD in a medical framework means that patients can gain 452 access to the legal authority and technical competency of physicians in administering or providing (lethal) 453 medication, thus guaranteeing a death that is quick and free from complications. However, we observe a 454 repeated emphasis by the proponents on the interactive process, rather than the final act, mandated by a 455 medicolegal regime of PAD and the ways in which that process can transform suffering at the end of life. 456
Proponents argue that placing the practice within a medical framework places the twinned moral 457 obligations of medicine -maintaining life and relieving suffering -into conflict. On the one hand, this moral 458 conflict functions as an important safeguard. As one public health researcher says, "I think that's sort of the 459 point of [the involvement of] medicine is that medicine engages the skeptics who aren't really in favour of 460 making this too easy" (interviewee 14). One the other hand, this moral conflict has the potential for improving 461 patient-physician relationship. Proponents argue that when considering patients' requests for PAD, physicians 462 would need to expend emotional labour to overcome the ingrained ethical obligation to maintain life and 463 identify fully instead with patient's suffering. As one Dutch physician testifying for the claimants says, 464 physicians "will have to bond with the patient in order to find out what the suffering of the patient really 465 entails…What I meant by that is that still if you talk unbearable suffering and doctor and patient join in the 466 decision that there really is unbearable suffering, there has to be an identification of the physician with what 467 the patient goes through" (trial transcript). Thus, for physicians, placing PAD within a medical framework is 468 generative of emotional labor that could reshape patient-physician relationship in important ways.
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Furthermore, proponents stress the significance of the regime for patients even if the lethal medication is never 470 used or obtained by the patient. They argue that a medicolegal regime of PAD essentially functions as a crucial 471 network of support for patients. As one lay witness with ALS writes, "[w]hat having the right to physician-472 assisted dying would do, more than anything, is lift the isolation and burden I feel as a dying person" (affidavit, 473 Petrie). 474
Much of the research on the right-to-die movement focus on the autonomy argument of the 477 proponents, which is understandable given that their legal arguments make explicit appeal to autonomy-based 478 human rights, such as the right to liberty, that are "the dominant global social justice ideology, the set of tools 479 available to social justice activists" (Merry, 2014, 288) . This article asks instead how PAD proponents articulate 480 suffering with the role of medicine at the end of life. McInerney (2006; has studied the movement's 481 "construction of the contemporary dying as horrific, intolerable, and beyond the ameliorative powers of 482 medicine and palliative care" (2006, 664) . However, her study analyses the media representation of this 483 construction rather than the construction that emanates directly from the proponents' discourse, as we do 484 here. 485
Focusing on autonomy may obscure other important considerations and present an incomplete picture 486 of PAD. Beauchamp (2006, 644), for example, has argued that "this history [of PAD], still in the making, is a 487 history of expanding commitments to autonomy." We argue that the story of PAD is also about the 488 'paradoxical' use (Richards, 2015) of the framework of the medicalization of dying by the proponents of 489 assisted death in the 21 st century. In this article, we have used Carter as a 'critical case' to investigate how 490 'suffering' is mobilised by proponents as a discursive construct to achieve their political goals. We began by 491 providing background information on the Carter case. We then discussed the medicalization of dying prior to 492 presenting our results. In the rest of this section, we reflect critically on the data. In social movement studies, "diagnostic framing" refers to the process of defining a social problem and 497 focusing blame or responsibility (Benford & Snow, 2000) . Here, proponents fault the cultural context of 498 medicine where life-prolongation is a moral imperative and physicians are paternalistic and death-denying. In 499 the case of palliative care, proponents emphasize its limitations and, like mainstream medicine, its 500 exacerbation of suffering at the end of life. In this way, proponents impose a limit to the therapeutic reach of 501 palliative care that comes to be seen as legitimate and rational, rather than (merely) politically expedient. 502
It should come as no surprise that in the debate over legalization, proponents see the need to 503 problematize the relationship between palliative care and suffering in EOLC; if palliative care is fully capable of 504 alleviating suffering, there would be no need for PAD. Palliative care professionals have been one of the most 505 vocal stakeholders in the debate and most of them have voiced public opposition to PAD. Further, as palliative 506 care developed, it has been able to claim "measurable and striking successes" (Clark & Seymour, 1999, 906) in 507 pain and symptoms management. Proponents claim that such successes need to be qualified. As our study 508 participants argue, the ability of palliative care to relieve suffering has limits which they locate in the suffering 509 of persons with non-cancer diseases. Indeed, the discursive space taken up by talk and text of 510 neurodegenerative illnesses by the proponents -via their discussion of 'existential suffering' -is 511 disproportionately larger than that of cancer considering that evidence from permissive jurisdictions shows 512 cancer patients making up the majority of persons requesting and accessing PAD (Smets et al., 2010; Oregon 513 Health Authority, 2015). Proponents also point out that even in palliative care's traditional area of strength -514 cancer care -not all suffering could be mitigated. Proponents thus charge as illusory palliative care's goal of 515 addressing 'total pain'. Proponents even go so far as to make the bold claim that palliative care interventions 516 could cause suffering. These interventions range from the conventional use of opioids (as having "10 517 contraindications") to the more controversial use of palliative sedation where proponents argue that palliative 518 sedation could, in fact, cause additional suffering in those keeping vigil by the bedsides of dying persons.
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Proponents' discourse on palliative sedation merits greater attention because it has implications for 520 palliative care's claim that it provides "impeccable assessment and treatment of pain and other symptoms" to 521 people facing life-limiting illnesses (WHO, 2016). Proponents argue that palliative sedation merely masks, 522 rather than alleviates, suffering. Citing Morris (1997) , Clark and Seymour (1999) note that palliation used to be 523 a pejorative term in the medical lexicon due to the double meaning of palliation: one the one hand, to cloak, 524 and on the other hand, to shield. When used in the first sense, palliation was seen to be a failing of medicine 525 for it only disguised or covered up symptoms leaving the underlying diseases untouched. In arguing that 526 palliative sedation only covers up bodily expressions of suffering while leaving the suffering itself untouched, 527 we see proponents resurrecting and inscribing the pejorative sense of palliation to palliative sedation 528 specifically and palliative care in general. 529
One widespread assumption in the debate over PAD is that physician-assisted suicide and euthanasia 530 constitute the "ultimate brakes on the unrestrained use of medical technology at the end of life" (Salem, 1999, 531 30) . In other words, PAD practices "are the instruments that promote the 'demedicalization' of death" (ibid.). 532
Our analysis shows how such assumption may come to be; proponents' articulation of suffering with 533 mainstream medicine and palliative care seemingly point to their absolute rejection. However, as Salem (1999) 534 has trenchantly argued, it would be a mistake to adopt this assumption uncritically. 535 It needs to be made explicit that the Criminal Code makes no specific mention of the construct of 536 physician-assisted dying. The provisions challenged by the claimants collectively have the practical effect of 537 prohibiting PAD. The claimants did not seek a wholesale invalidation of those provisions. Rather, they sought a 538 declaration of invalidity for those provisions only in the context of PAD. We mention this to highlight the fact 539 that from the outset the claimants had no intention of advocating for a system in which assisted dying would 540 be placed outside of a medical framework. As the Crown Counsel made cogently clear in her address to the SCC 541 Justices, what the proponents wanted was medicalized assisted dying. The proponents could have pushed for a 542 Swiss-type change in law. In Switzerland, the act of assisting in another person's suicide is not illegal so long as 543 it is done without selfish motives (Hurst & Mauron, 2003) . The Swiss regime does not require the participation 544 M A N U S C R I P T
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22 of physicians and consequently allows for non-physicians (and non-healthcare professionals in general) to play 545 an important role. In Carter, the proponents stress instead the absolute necessity of the participation of 546 physicians in any subsequent regime. In fact, looking more broadly beyond Canada, with the exception of 547
Switzerland, in all places where legal regimes have been instituted, the social and cultural legitimacy of assisted 548 dying has required it to be located within a medical framework (Timmermans, 2005) . As Ost (2010, 7) aptly 549 observes: 550
Significantly, legal, ethical and social discourses surrounding assisted dying and laws that have 551 permitted assisted dying have tended to focus on the assistance of doctors, the provision of medicine 552
to cause death and medical grounds for requesting death, that is pain and suffering derived from 553 medical conditions. As such, medicine has provided the main frame of references, a vital component of 554 the phenomenon of assisted death. 555 556
This, then, suggests to us that the medicalization of dying, far from being seen as a constraining framework for 557 proponents, is used by them for constructive ends. This conclusion is supported by our data whereby the 558 proponents argue that the significance of a PAD regime lies beyond the legal provision of lethal medication. To 559 be sure, their insistence on medical control is also meant to temper the fear of harm on the vulnerable. 560 Nevertheless, they emphasize what they see to be the transformative power of physicians' involvement in PAD. 561
Proponents argue that in order to satisfy the due care criteria of a permissive regime, physicians need to form 562 an empathic bond with patients. From the patient's perspective, such involvement of physicians -and 563 healthcare professionals more broadlycould have an alleviating effect on suffering by reconstituting and 564 strengthening the dying person's social network, even if the process does not culminate in the provision or 565 administration of lethal medication. Indeed, Norwood's (2007; 2009) Medicalization is a widespread phenomenon that has transformed many aspects of social life (Conrad, 572 2013), including dying. Reading through the medicalization of dying literature, one cannot help but be struck by 573 the overwhelming negative tone by authors on the medicalized forms of contemporary dying (Glaser & Strauss, 574 1966; Glaser & Strauss, 1980; Halper, 1979; Illich, 1976; IOM, 2014; McNamara & Rosenwax, 2007; Sudnow, 575 1967; Timmermans, 2010) . In essence, critics argue that the involvement of medicine at the end of life has 576 served only to increase, rather than attenuate, suffering. In this article, we've shown how one group of actors 577 not only reproduces but expands this line of critique to include palliative care. However, it would be a mistake 578 to interpret proponents' rejection of the status quo as a rejection of medicine. That is, PAD proponents are not 579 trying to demedicalize the dying process. In fact we have shown how the proponents use the medicalization 580 framework for emancipatory ends. While such productive use of the medicalization framework by social 581 movement actors has been observed elsewhere (Conrad, 2013; Torres, 2014) , the significance of our findings 582 and analysis must be considered in light of the fact that the right-to-die movement emerged historically as a 583 counter-response to medicalization. Discussing the right-to-die movement and palliative care, McInerney 584 observes that these were two voices "in the growing critique of medicine's omniscience in relation to death, 585 and of the situation for many individuals at life's end" (2000, 141) . In this article we have shown how such 586 critique by the proponents of PAD has not resulted in the demedicalization of dying in the 21 st century. We 587 argue that their articulation of suffering with the role and place of medicine at the end of life must instead be 588 understood as a discourse through which one configuration of EOLC comes to be rejected and another 589 accepted, a discourse that does not at all challenge the larger framework of the medicalization within which 590 contemporary dying is experienced. • Proponents of physician-assisted dying (PAD) articulate 'suffering' with the role of medicine.
• Draws upon data from study of Carter v. Canada, which decriminalized PAD in Canada.
• Proponents' discourse rejects one but accepts another end-of-life care configuration.
• Proponents make productive use of the medicalization of death and dying.
